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In his paper "Vote-Trading and the Voting
Paradox: A Proof of Logical Equivalence"
David Koehler1 claims to have proved the equiva-
lence of logrolling and the paradox of voting.
Unfortunately, the proofs given by Koehler do
not have the general validity he intends them to
have. Indeed, it is easy to show that logrolling
does not necessarily imply the paradox of voting,
nor does the paradox of voting imply the existence
of logrolling situations.
I begin by first demonstrating with the help of
a counter-example that certain logrolling situa-
tions do not imply the paradox of voting. This is
not very surprising, since to prove that logrolling
implies the paradox, it has been necessary to
assume the absence of a certain kind of comple-
mentarity among issues.2 In the counter-example
a group of three voters, Vu F2 and F3, has to
decide two issues x and y. The two issues each
contain two alternatives, namely, xu x2 and yu
yi. In Matrix 1 the utility payoffs for voters Vu
Kj and V3 are given for the four possible out-
comes (xu yd, (xi, yi), (x2, yd and (x2, yi).
Matrix 1
Moves available
y-i
to all voters Xl
8,8,
6,2,
8
10
Xi
2,10,2
10,6,6
With simple majority voting x2 and _y2 will re-
ceive a majority of votes, so that (x2, yi) will be
the outcome selected by the group. This result
follows, because X\ is dominated by x2 for F2,
and_yi by yi for F3. With no knowledge about the
behavior of the other voters F2 will, therefore,
vote for x2 and F3 for y2. Fi knows this situation
and consequently casts his votes for x% and y2,
since by doing so his most preferred outcome
(xi, yi) will get a majority.
'David H. Koehler, "Vote-Trading and the Voting
Paradox: A Proof of Logical Equivalence," American
Political Science Review, 69 (September, 1975), 954-
960.
2
 Peter Bernholz, "Logrolling, Arrow-Paradox and
Decision Rules: A Generalization," Kyklos, 22 (fasc.
1, 1974), 53, assumption A5.
But now voters F2 and F3 prefer (*i, yd to
(*2, yi) because of the higher payoffs 8>6. And
they can obtain this outcome by making a log-
rolling agreement. According to this agreement
F2 votes for xi as against x2, which is against his
immediate interest, to get in exchange F3's vote
for y\ as against yi, which is contrary to F3's
immediate advantage. This exchange of votes is,
however, favorable to both, since y\ strongly
dominates yi for F2, and Xi strongly dominates
xi for F3. Consequently, a typical logrolling situ-
ation is present.
It is now quite obvious that in the case given
above, logrolling does not imply the paradox of
voting. For (x2, yd as well as (xu yi) are preferred
to Oi, yd by only one voter. (xu yd is a stable out-
come. Note, moreover, that (x2, yi)P\(xi, yd,
(x2, yi)Pi(xu yi) and (*i, ydPfai, yd, (*i, yd
Pi(xi, yi), where Pi means "preferred to by Fi."
As a consequence just the kind of complementar-
ity is present, the absence of which had to be as-
sumed to prove that logrolling situations imply
the paradox of voting.2
I proceed to show that cyclical group prefer-
ences do not generally imply the presence of
logrolling situations. First, it has to be mentioned
that Koehler has not given a proof for cycles
containing more than three alternatives. But it is
obvious that cyclical group preference orderings
with more than three alternatives A\ can exist.
In general, we have:
AxPA.PA.P • • • PAn^PAnPAx,
where P means "preferred to by a majority of the
group." Koehler's proof is only concerned with
the case, in which n = 3, and no proof has been
given for n>3.
Secondly, consider Koehler's case with n = 3:
Even in this case the paradox of voting need not
imply logrolling situations. For assume that A\, Ai
and A, belong all to one issue A. For example, the
Ai may represent three different bridges, out of
which one has to be selected by the group, since
only one bridge can be built because of budgetary
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restrictions. In this case substantive logrolling is
obviously not possible, since there are no two
issues concerning which votes can be exchanged
by group members.
The above considerations prove not only that
Koehler has failed to show the logical equivalence
of logrolling and the paradox of voting but also
that such a proof is impossible. What Koehler
has demonstrated—but only for three group
members and for two issues—is that under certain
conditions logrolling and the paradox of voting
are equivalent. But his belief that he had given a
general proof prevented him from trying to find
these conditions. As mentioned above, one of
these conditions is the absence of a certain kind
of complementarity among the relevant issues.
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